MCP/Risk

Scan report

com.1inch.business/mcp

remote, scanned 2026-09-10, tool surface via remote-tools-list

This page reports an automated security scan of com.1inch.business/mcp (remote), scanned 2026-09-10. It rates trust (provenance, transport, known vulnerabilities, instruction integrity) as grade F and capability risk (what the tools can do) separately at low. It does not certify the server is safe to connect; it reports what could be checked from outside.

Tool surface changed. This server’s tool schema differs from its previous scan (2026-07-28). Re-review §2 and §5 before continuing to trust it - silent schema changes are the "rug pull" pattern.

Automated checks

StatusCheckPolicyResult
PASS Listed on the official MCP registry §1.1
Listed on registry.modelcontextprotocol.io as com.1inch.business/mcp. 1 finding
  • Registry entry: com.1inch.business/mcp
PASS Source repository is public and maintained §1.2
Active repository with a license. 5 findings
  • Repository
  • Last push: 13 days ago
  • Stars: 2
  • License: MIT
  • Security policy (SECURITY.md): absent
INFO Published package is consistent and attested §1.3

No published package associated with this server (remote-only or non-npm/PyPI source).

PASS Tool surface is inspectable and proportionate §2.1–§2.4
10 tool(s) enumerated; no high-risk capability signals. 2 findings
  • Tools exposed: 10
  • Detected capabilities: none
PASS HTTPS-only endpoint §3.1
Endpoint uses HTTPS. 1 finding
  • Endpoint: https://api.1inch.com/mcp/protocol
UNVERIFIABLE Authentication required §3.2

Endpoint rejected the probe (HTTP 400); whether it requires authentication could not be determined.

PASS OAuth protected-resource metadata published §3.3
Publishes /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource per the June 2025 authorization spec. 1 finding
  • Authorization server: https://api.1inch.com
INFO No known vulnerabilities (OSV.dev) §4.1

No package to query (remote-only server).

FAIL Server-supplied instructions free of poisoning indicators §5.1–§5.4
8 suspicious indicator(s) found in server-supplied instructions, tool descriptions, or schemas. 8 findings
  • swap description: oversized: 2980 chars (limit 2048)
  • orderbook description: oversized: 2087 chars (limit 2048)
  • product_api description: oversized: 4862 chars (limit 2048)
  • walletconnect description: oversized: 3524 chars (limit 2048)
  • server instructions: non-http URI scheme: file://1inch-mcp/guides/aqua-workflow
  • swap: concealment directive: Do not mention, compare, or suggest other swap types unless the user
  • product_api: non-http URI scheme: file://1inch-mcp/guides/x402-payments
  • aqua: non-http URI scheme: file://1inch-mcp/guides/aqua-workflow

Verify manually - the scoring model can’t judge these for you

  • §2.3 - Is the tool surface no broader than the server’s stated purpose requires?
  • §3.4 - For stdio servers: which environment credentials does it read, and are they scoped rather than org-wide tokens?
  • §6.1 - Cross this server’s capabilities with your already-connected servers: any read-capability × send-capability pairs need explicit sign-off.
  • §6.2 - Run the connecting agent with sandboxing and egress controls sized to the combined tool surface, not just this server’s.

Methodology: MCP Server Security Policy. Checks and scoring weights are open source. Unfamiliar term? See the glossary.