MCP/Risk

Scan report

co.workix/mcp

npm, scanned 2026-09-11, tool surface via package-source

This page reports an automated security scan of co.workix/mcp (npm), scanned 2026-09-11. It rates trust (provenance, transport, known vulnerabilities, instruction integrity) as grade A and capability risk (what the tools can do) separately at critical. It does not certify the server is safe to connect; it reports what could be checked from outside.

Automated checks

StatusCheckPolicyResult
PASS Listed on the official MCP registry §1.1
Listed on registry.modelcontextprotocol.io as co.workix/mcp. 1 finding
  • Registry entry: co.workix/mcp
PASS Source repository is public and maintained §1.2
Active repository with a license. 5 findings
  • Repository
  • Last push: 1 days ago
  • Stars: 13
  • License: NOASSERTION
  • Security policy (SECURITY.md): absent
WARN Published package is consistent and attested §1.3
Minor integrity gaps: no npm provenance attestation. 6 findings
  • Package: @workix/mcp@1.0.0
  • Ecosystem: npm
  • Age: 46 days
  • Weekly downloads: 67
  • Repo field matches source repo: true
  • Build-provenance attestation: absent
PASS Tool surface is inspectable and proportionate §2.1–§2.4
Package source scanned. Capabilities detected: filesystem, network-egress, process-execution. Reported as capability risk (§2.4); whether each is essential to the server's stated purpose is §2.3 and remains a manual judgement. 21 findings
  • filesystem (filesystem write/delete): dist/adapterLoader.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/adapterLoader.js
  • network-egress (outbound network calls): dist/adapterLoader.js
  • filesystem (filesystem write/delete): dist/adapters/ats.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/adapters/ats.js
  • filesystem (filesystem write/delete): dist/tools/browser_apply.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/tools/browser_apply.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/telegram/channels.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/cookies.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/db.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/env.js
  • network-egress (outbound network calls): dist/http.js
  • network-egress (http module import): dist/http.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/tools/hub.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/adapters/jobspipe.js
  • process-execution (child process execution): dist/adapters/jobspy.js
  • process-execution (child process module import): dist/adapters/jobspy.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/tools/store_admin.js
  • filesystem (fs module import): dist/telegram/tdlib.js
  • network-egress (outbound network calls): dist/adapters/telegram.js
  • Detected capabilities: filesystem, network-egress, process-execution
INFO Transport & authentication §3

Local (stdio) server: runs with host-process privileges by design. Transport checks apply to remote servers; scrutiny shifts to §1/§2.

PASS No known vulnerabilities (OSV.dev) §4.1

No advisories on record for @workix/mcp @1.0.0 (npm).

PASS Server-supplied instructions free of poisoning indicators §5.1–§5.4

No poisoning indicators found across 4 server-supplied text item(s).

Verify manually - the scoring model can’t judge these for you

  • §2.3 - Is the tool surface no broader than the server’s stated purpose requires?
  • §3.4 - For stdio servers: which environment credentials does it read, and are they scoped rather than org-wide tokens?
  • §6.1 - Cross this server’s capabilities with your already-connected servers: any read-capability × send-capability pairs need explicit sign-off.
  • §6.2 - Run the connecting agent with sandboxing and egress controls sized to the combined tool surface, not just this server’s.

Methodology: MCP Server Security Policy. Checks and scoring weights are open source. Unfamiliar term? See the glossary.