MCP/Risk

Scan report

cloud.dchub/mcp-server

remote, scanned 2026-09-10, tool surface via remote-tools-list

This page reports an automated security scan of cloud.dchub/mcp-server (remote), scanned 2026-09-10. It rates trust (provenance, transport, known vulnerabilities, instruction integrity) as grade C and capability risk (what the tools can do) separately at high. It does not certify the server is safe to connect; it reports what could be checked from outside.

Tool surface changed. This server’s tool schema differs from its previous scan (2026-07-28). Re-review §2 and §5 before continuing to trust it - silent schema changes are the "rug pull" pattern.

Automated checks

StatusCheckPolicyResult
PASS Listed on the official MCP registry §1.1
Listed on registry.modelcontextprotocol.io as cloud.dchub/mcp-server. 1 finding
  • Registry entry: cloud.dchub/mcp-server
PASS Source repository is public and maintained §1.2
Active repository with a license. 5 findings
  • Repository
  • Last push: 0 days ago
  • Stars: 2
  • License: MIT
  • Security policy (SECURITY.md): absent
INFO Published package is consistent and attested §1.3

No published package associated with this server (remote-only or non-npm/PyPI source).

PASS Tool surface is inspectable and proportionate §2.1–§2.4
88 tool(s) enumerated. Capabilities detected: network-egress. Reported as capability risk (§2.4); whether each is essential to the server's stated purpose is §2.3 and remains a manual judgement. 7 findings
  • Tools exposed: 88
  • set_shortlist_alert: network-egress
  • set_market_alert: network-egress
  • list_standing_intents: network-egress
  • register_standing_intent: network-egress
  • delete_standing_intent: network-egress
  • Detected capabilities: network-egress
PASS HTTPS-only endpoint §3.1
Endpoint uses HTTPS. 1 finding
  • Endpoint: https://dchub.cloud/mcp
FAIL Authentication required §3.2

Server answers anonymous requests (HTTP 200) while exposing non-trivial or unverifiable capabilities - fail per §3.2.

PASS OAuth protected-resource metadata published §3.3
Publishes /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource per the June 2025 authorization spec. 1 finding
  • Authorization server: https://beloved-stream-52.authkit.app
INFO No known vulnerabilities (OSV.dev) §4.1

No package to query (remote-only server).

WARN Server-supplied instructions free of poisoning indicators §5.1–§5.4
11 suspicious indicator(s) found in server-supplied instructions, tool descriptions, or schemas. 11 findings
  • server instructions: oversized: 10893 chars (limit 4096)
  • get_grid_scoreboard description: oversized: 2341 chars (limit 2048)
  • get_refined_queue description: oversized: 2065 chars (limit 2048)
  • get_hosting_capacity description: oversized: 2305 chars (limit 2048)
  • find_sites description: oversized: 2651 chars (limit 2048)
  • analyze_site description: oversized: 2476 chars (limit 2048)
  • get_grid_intelligence description: oversized: 2054 chars (limit 2048)
  • get_gas_intelligence description: oversized: 2097 chars (limit 2048)
  • rank_markets description: oversized: 2187 chars (limit 2048)
  • claim_free_key description: oversized: 4421 chars (limit 2048)
  • bind_email description: oversized: 2333 chars (limit 2048)

Verify manually - the scoring model can’t judge these for you

  • §2.3 - Is the tool surface no broader than the server’s stated purpose requires?
  • §3.4 - For stdio servers: which environment credentials does it read, and are they scoped rather than org-wide tokens?
  • §6.1 - Cross this server’s capabilities with your already-connected servers: any read-capability × send-capability pairs need explicit sign-off.
  • §6.2 - Run the connecting agent with sandboxing and egress controls sized to the combined tool surface, not just this server’s.

Methodology: MCP Server Security Policy. Checks and scoring weights are open source. Unfamiliar term? See the glossary.