MCP Risk

Scan report

biz.icecat/mcp

This page reports an automated security scan of biz.icecat/mcp (remote), scanned 2026-07-28. It rates trust (provenance, transport, known vulnerabilities, instruction integrity) as grade B and capability risk (what the tools can do) separately at low. It does not certify the server is safe to connect; it reports what could be checked from outside.

remote, scanned 2026-07-28, tool surface via remote-tools-list

B 82/100 Capability risk: Low permalink

The grade rates trust: provenance, transport, known vulnerabilities and instruction integrity. Capability risk rates what the tools can do and is reported, not penalised – a server built to run shell commands is doing its job (Policy §2.4).

Automated checks

StatusCheckPolicyResult
PASS Listed on the official MCP registry §1.1
Listed on registry.modelcontextprotocol.io as biz.icecat/mcp. 1 finding
  • Registry entry: biz.icecat/mcp ↗
WARN Source repository is public and maintained §1.2

No public source repository could be identified for this server.
INFO Published package is consistent and attested §1.3

No published package associated with this server (remote-only or non-npm/PyPI source).
PASS Tool surface is inspectable and proportionate §2.1–§2.4
19 tool(s) enumerated; no high-risk capability signals. 2 findings
  • Tools exposed: 19
  • Detected capabilities: none
PASS HTTPS-only endpoint §3.1
Endpoint uses HTTPS. 1 finding
  • Endpoint: https://mcp.icecat.biz
WARN Authentication required §3.2

Server answers anonymous requests (HTTP 200). Acceptable only for deliberately public, read-only (Low) servers.
UNVERIFIABLE OAuth protected-resource metadata published §3.3

Metadata endpoint unreachable: Unexpected end of JSON input
INFO No known vulnerabilities (OSV.dev) §4.1

No package to query (remote-only server).
PASS Server-supplied instructions free of poisoning indicators §5.1–§5.4

No poisoning indicators found across 38 server-supplied text item(s).

Verify manually - the scoring model can’t judge these for you

  • §2.3 - Is the tool surface no broader than the server’s stated purpose requires?
  • §3.4 - For stdio servers: which environment credentials does it read, and are they scoped rather than org-wide tokens?
  • §6.1 - Cross this server’s capabilities with your already-connected servers: any read-capability × send-capability pairs need explicit sign-off.
  • §6.2 - Run the connecting agent with sandboxing and egress controls sized to the combined tool surface, not just this server’s.

Methodology: MCP Server Security Policy. Checks and scoring weights are open source. Unfamiliar term? See the glossary.