MCP Risk

Scan report

app.qwady/borough

This page reports an automated security scan of app.qwady/borough (npm), scanned 2026-07-28. It rates trust (provenance, transport, known vulnerabilities, instruction integrity) as grade C and capability risk (what the tools can do) separately at critical. It does not certify the server is safe to connect; it reports what could be checked from outside.

npm, scanned 2026-07-28, tool surface via package-source

C 70/100 Capability risk: Critical permalink

The grade rates trust: provenance, transport, known vulnerabilities and instruction integrity. Capability risk rates what the tools can do and is reported, not penalised – a server built to run shell commands is doing its job (Policy §2.4).

Automated checks

StatusCheckPolicyResult
PASS Listed on the official MCP registry §1.1
Listed on registry.modelcontextprotocol.io as app.qwady/borough. 1 finding
  • Registry entry: app.qwady/borough ↗
FAIL Source repository is public and maintained §1.2

Claimed source repository does not exist (or is private).
FAIL Published package is consistent and attested §1.3
Integrity concerns: package repository field does not match the claimed source repo; no npm provenance attestation. 6 findings
  • Package: @borough/mcp@1.2.2 ↗
  • Ecosystem: npm
  • Age: 158 days
  • Weekly downloads: 206
  • Repo field matches source repo: false
  • Build-provenance attestation: absent
PASS Tool surface is inspectable and proportionate §2.1–§2.4
Package source scanned. Capabilities detected: process-execution. Reported as capability risk (§2.4); whether each is essential to the server's stated purpose is §2.3 and remains a manual judgement. 3 findings
  • process-execution (child process execution): dist/index.js
  • process-execution (child process module import): dist/index.js
  • Detected capabilities: process-execution
PASS HTTPS-only endpoint §3.1
Endpoint uses HTTPS. 1 finding
  • Endpoint: https://borough.qwady.app/mcp
PASS Authentication required §3.2
Server rejects anonymous requests and advertises its auth scheme. 1 finding
  • WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="https://borough.qwady.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
PASS OAuth protected-resource metadata published §3.3
Publishes /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource per the June 2025 authorization spec. 1 finding
  • Authorization server: https://borough.qwady.app
PASS No known vulnerabilities (OSV.dev) §4.1

No advisories on record for @borough/mcp @1.2.2 (npm).
UNVERIFIABLE Server-supplied instructions free of poisoning indicators §5.1–§5.4

No server-supplied instructions or tool descriptions were obtainable to scan.

Verify manually - the scoring model can’t judge these for you

  • §2.3 - Is the tool surface no broader than the server’s stated purpose requires?
  • §3.4 - For stdio servers: which environment credentials does it read, and are they scoped rather than org-wide tokens?
  • §6.1 - Cross this server’s capabilities with your already-connected servers: any read-capability × send-capability pairs need explicit sign-off.
  • §6.2 - Run the connecting agent with sandboxing and egress controls sized to the combined tool surface, not just this server’s.

Methodology: MCP Server Security Policy. Checks and scoring weights are open source. Unfamiliar term? See the glossary.