MCP Risk

Scan report

ai.chronary/mcp

This page reports an automated security scan of ai.chronary/mcp (npm), scanned 2026-07-28. It rates trust (provenance, transport, known vulnerabilities, instruction integrity) as grade B and capability risk (what the tools can do) separately at high. It does not certify the server is safe to connect; it reports what could be checked from outside.

npm, scanned 2026-07-28, tool surface via remote-tools-list

B 84/100 Capability risk: High permalink

The grade rates trust: provenance, transport, known vulnerabilities and instruction integrity. Capability risk rates what the tools can do and is reported, not penalised – a server built to run shell commands is doing its job (Policy §2.4).

Automated checks

StatusCheckPolicyResult
PASS Listed on the official MCP registry §1.1
Listed on registry.modelcontextprotocol.io as ai.chronary/mcp. 1 finding
  • Registry entry: ai.chronary/mcp ↗
PASS Source repository is public and maintained §1.2
Active repository with a license. 5 findings
  • Repository ↗
  • Last push: 13 days ago
  • Stars: 0
  • License: Apache-2.0
  • Security policy (SECURITY.md): absent
PASS Published package is consistent and attested §1.3
Package is consistent with its source and carries provenance attestation. 6 findings
  • Package: @chronary/mcp@1.5.2 ↗
  • Ecosystem: npm
  • Age: 69 days
  • Weekly downloads: 132
  • Repo field matches source repo: true
  • Build-provenance attestation: present
PASS Tool surface is inspectable and proportionate §2.1–§2.4
54 tool(s) enumerated. Capabilities detected: network-egress. Reported as capability risk (§2.4); whether each is essential to the server's stated purpose is §2.3 and remains a manual judgement. 10 findings
  • Tools exposed: 54
  • cancel_proposal: network-egress
  • create_webhook: network-egress
  • list_webhooks: network-egress
  • get_webhook: network-egress
  • update_webhook: network-egress
  • delete_webhook: network-egress
  • list_webhook_deliveries: network-egress
  • create_booking_page: network-egress
  • Detected capabilities: network-egress
PASS HTTPS-only endpoint §3.1
Endpoint uses HTTPS. 1 finding
  • Endpoint: https://api.chronary.ai/mcp
FAIL Authentication required §3.2

Server answers anonymous requests (HTTP 200) while exposing non-trivial or unverifiable capabilities - fail per §3.2.
WARN OAuth protected-resource metadata published §3.3
No protected-resource metadata found - clients cannot discover the authorization server per spec. 1 finding
  • Checked: https://api.chronary.ai/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
PASS No known vulnerabilities (OSV.dev) §4.1

No advisories on record for @chronary/mcp @1.5.2 (npm).
PASS Server-supplied instructions free of poisoning indicators §5.1–§5.4

No poisoning indicators found across 112 server-supplied text item(s).

Verify manually - the scoring model can’t judge these for you

  • §2.3 - Is the tool surface no broader than the server’s stated purpose requires?
  • §3.4 - For stdio servers: which environment credentials does it read, and are they scoped rather than org-wide tokens?
  • §6.1 - Cross this server’s capabilities with your already-connected servers: any read-capability × send-capability pairs need explicit sign-off.
  • §6.2 - Run the connecting agent with sandboxing and egress controls sized to the combined tool surface, not just this server’s.

Methodology: MCP Server Security Policy. Checks and scoring weights are open source. Unfamiliar term? See the glossary.